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1. In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago proposed the creation of an In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) to the General Assembly of the
United Nations (UN) to aid in the fight against narcotics trafficking.
This proposal revived the UN's work in connection with the establish-
ment of an International Criminal Court. Previously, two special com-
mittees of the General Assembly had painstakingly developed in 19512
and 19533 draft statutes for a permanent International Criminal
Court, but it had been tabled as a result of the "cold war." The only
other UN initiative was in 1980 when a draft statute for the establish-
ment of an international criminal jurisdiction to enforce the Apartheid
Convention 4 was proposed, but it too was left without follow-up.
2. While there was little hope for the prospects of an ICC between
1989 and 1992, a chain of events was set in motion when the UN Se-
* All rights reserved to the author. Printed from ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE
DROIT PENALE, 13 NouvELLEs ETUDES PENALES 1997. Professor of Law, President, Inter-
national Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University; President, International Asso-
ciation of Penal Law; President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences; Vice-Chairman, UN Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of a Perma-
nent International Criminal Court; Former Chairman and Rapporteur on the Gathering
and Analysis of the Facts, Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 780 (1992) to investigate violations of international humanitarian
law in the Former Yugoslavia. The views expressed herein are solely the author's. The
research assistance of Daniel Mac Sweeney is acknowledged.
1. See Report of the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, UN Doc. A/51/22
(1996)[hereinafter Report of the Preparatory Committee].
2. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 1 - 31 Aug. 1951,
U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11, annex I, UN Doc. A/2136 (1952) [hereinafter 1951
ICC Draft Statute]. For a history of international efforts to establish an International
Criminal Court, see BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP To-
WARDS WORLD PEACE (1980).
3. Report of the 1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 27 July - 20
Aug. 1953, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, annex, UN Doc. A/2645 (1954) [hereinaf-
ter 1953 Revised ICC Draft Statute].
4. DRAFT STATUTE FOR THE CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION TO
IMPLEMENT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE
CRIME OF Apartheid, Jan. 19, 1980, UN Doc. E/CN.411416 [hereinafter APARTHEID STAT-
urE]. The text, developed by this writer, is commented on in M. Cherif Bassiouni and
Daniel H. Derby, Final Report on the establishment of an international criminal court for
the implementation of the Apartheid Convention and other relevant international instru-
ments, 9 HOFsTRA L. REv. 523.
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curity Council in Resolution 7805 established a Commission of Experts
to investigate violations of international humanitarian law in the For-
mer Yugoslavia. 6 This was the first time since World War II that the
international community provided for the investigation of violators of
international humanitarian law. In its first Interim Report, the Com-
mission of Experts stated that the establishment of an ad hoc interna-
tional criminal tribunal would be "consistent with the direction of its
work."7 Recalling that report, the Security Council in Resolution 808
proceeded to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the For-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTFY).8 The Resolution stated that the Security
Council: "[diecidefd] that an international criminal tribunal shall be
established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of
the former Yugoslavia since 1991[.] 9
The Security Council followed the same procedure in 1994 in con-
nection with the events in Rwanda, and established the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).10 The events in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda shocked the world out of its complacency and the idea of pros-
5. S.C. Res. 780, UN SCOR, 47th Year, 1992 S.C. Res. & Dec. at 36, para. 2, UN
Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
6. United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Coun-
cil Resolution 780 (1992) to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in
the Former Yugoslavia. For the Commission's Final Report, see Final Report of the Com-
mission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992) U.N.
SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/19941674 (May 27, 1994) and the Annexes to the Final Re-
port, U.N. Doc S/19941674/Add.2 (1994). For a description of the Commission's work, see
M. CHERIF BAssIOUNI, THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT To SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION .780: INVESTIGATING VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAw IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, Occasional Paper No. 2, International Human Rights
Law Institute, DePaul University College of Law (1996).
7. Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Feb.
9, 1993, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., para. 74, UN Dec S/25274 (1993), transmitting Interim
Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992).
8. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 1, UN Doc. S/RES/808
(1993) [hereinafter ICTFY]. For a Commentary on the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNi (wrrIH THE COLLABORATION OF PETER
MANIKAs), THE LAw OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLA-
VIA (1996); VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1995).
9. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 8, para.1.
10. On the basis of the precedent of the Former Yugoslavia, the Security Council es-
tablished a similar Commission of Experts in S.C. Res. 935, UN SCOR, 49th Year,
3400th mtg., at 1, UN Dec. S/RES/935 (1994). That Commission did not, however, en-
gage in investigations and lasted only three months. The Security Council subsequently
set up a judicial mechanism for Rwanda with ties to the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia in S.C. Res. 955, UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., at 1, UN
Doc. SIRES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. For a Commentary on the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, see Larry D. Johnson, The International Tribunal
for Rwanda, 67 REVUE INTERNATIONAL DE DRorr PENAL 211.
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ecuting those who committed international crimes acquired a broad
based support in world public opinion and in many governments.
3. Largely out of the 1989 initiative of Trinidad and Tobago, and
the International Law Commission's (ILC) work on the draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 1 the General As-
sembly in resolution 47/33 of November 25, 1992, requested that the
(ILC) undertake the elaboration of a draft statute for a permanent In-
ternational Criminal Court. By the time that this draft was produced
in 1994, the climate in which it was viewed had changed significantly
due in large part to the tragic victimization in the Yugoslav and
Rwandan conflicts, and the fact that the Security Council had estab-
lished in 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia 12 and in 1994, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.' 3 In order to guide its work in drafting a statute for the ICC,
the ILC looked to international precedents. They are: the Nuremberg 14
and TokyoI5 tribunal statutes, the 195116 and 195317 ICC draft stat-
utes, the 1980 draft statute for the creation of an international crimi-
nal jurisdiction to enforce the Apartheid convention,"' the 1993 ICTFY
Statute,19 and the 1994 ICTR Statute.
20
4. In 1994, the ILC completed a draft statute for an ICC and rec-
ommended to the General Assembly to call a conference of plenipoten-
tiaries "to study the draft statute and to conclude a convention on the
establishment of an international criminal court."21 However, the Sixth
Committee of the General Assembly, at the instigation of States reluc-
tant to see the court come into being so rapidly, declined to call a dip-
lomatic conference as the ILC had requested. Instead, the General As-
sembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to review the ILC's 1994
11. Concerning the 1991 draft Code against the Peace and Security of Mankind, see
Commentaries on the International Law Commission's 1991 Draft Code of Crimes
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 11 Nouvelles 9tudes Pdnales (1993).
12. See generally BAssiouNi, supra note 8.
13. See generally Larry Johnson, THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RwANDA, supra
note 10.
14. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the
European Axis (London Charter), signed at London, August 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 59
Stat.1544, E.A.S. No.472 (entered into force, Aug. 8, 1945), annex, Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal (Nuremberg).
15. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST PROCLAIMED AT TOKYO, Jan.
19, 1946, and amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (entered into force Jan. 19, 1946),
ANNEX, CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAsT (Tokyo).
16. 1951 ICC Draft Statute, supra note 2.
17. 1953 Revised ICC Draft Statute, supra note 3.
18. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal, 9
NouvELLs 9TUDES PENALES (1993).
19. ICTFY Statute, supra note 8.
20. ICTR Statute, supra note 10.
21. See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 46th session,
Official Records of the General Assembly, 49th Session, Suppl. No. 10, para. 90, A/49/10.
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draft statute.22 According to GA resolution 49/53 of 9 December 1994,
the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee was: "to review the major sub-
stantive and administrative issues arising out of the draft statute pre-
pared by the International Law Commission and, in the light of that
review, to consider arrangements for the convening of an international
conference of plenipotentiaries."
23
The General Assembly hoped that the Ad Hoc Committee would
resolve the differences between States favoring the establishment of an
ICC and those who were opposed or reluctant to see this result in the
short term. The Ad Hoc Committee met for two sessions in 1995, but
failed to come to sufficient agreement to call a conference of plenipo-
tentiaries. However, these meetings had the positive effect of allowing
States to familiarize themselves with the issues involved in the crea-
tion of an International Criminal Court. The educational value pro-
duced by the work of the Ad Hoc Committee served a beneficial pur-
pose and led to the establishment of a Preparatory Committee in 1996
(PrepCom). The mandate of the 1996 PrepCom 24 was explicitly goal-
oriented. The 1995 Ad Hoc Committee discussed the principal ideas
that made the work of the 1996 PrepCom more specific. Consideration
of the benefits of the meetings of the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee must be
tempered, however, with an acknowledgment of the difficulties that
still hinder elaboration of the draft statute. Proponents of the ICC
have had to face something of a constant effort to keep the process
moving forward. Due to the unfamiliarity of many with the important
topics involved, and the related desire of all parties to cast a court
which would be most useful, in their eyes, the process has sometimes
seemed to delay meaningful progress. Regarding the number of propos-
als that have been made by States and the fact that the PrepCom has
at times found it difficult to deal with them efficiently, it would proba-
bly be unfair to say that a purposeful war of attrition was being waged
by opponents of the court, nevertheless the costs that governments had
to bear in sending experts from capitals to long meetings in New York
was felt by many delegations.
5. Building the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, the 1996 PrepCom
was mandated by the General Assembly:
to discuss further the major substantive and administrative issues
arising out of the draft statute prepared by the International Law
Commission and, taking into account the different views expressed
during the meetings, to draft texts, with a view to preparing a
widely acceptable consolidated text of a convention for an interna-
tional criminal court as a next step towards consideration by a con-
22. See G.A. Res. 49/53, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., agenda item 137, UN Doc. A/RES/
49/53 (1994).





ference of plenipotentiaries, and [it was] also decide[ed] that the
work of the Preparatory Committee should be based on the draft
statute prepared by the International Law Commission and should
take into account the report of the Ad Hoc Committee and written
comments submitted by States . . . and, as appropriate, contribu-
tions of relevant organizations.25
As stated above, this mandate had a more specific, goal oriented
character and was therefore due progression from the earlier mandate
of the Ad Hoc Committee. The 1996 PrepCom did not, however, pro-
duce a "consolidated" text of a draft statute, and only succeeded in cre-
ating a report which compiled various proposals. On the basis on this
work, the 1996 PrepCom proposed to the General Assembly to con-
tinue its work with an enhanced mandate and meet for another nine
weeks in 1997-98 before a diplomatic conference could be held. With
all of this in mind, the 1996 PrepCom, in its report to the Sixth Com-
mittee stated: "recognizing that this is a matter for the General As-
sembly, . . . on the basis of its scheme of work, considers that it is re-
alistic to regard the holding of a diplomatic conference of
plenipotentiaries in 1998 as feasible."
26
The weakness of the language in this recommendation is, however
troubling. The insistence by some delegations on the inclusion of a
footnote in the recommendations of the 1996 PrepCom reserving their
positions on its findings and its decision to move towards a diplomatic
conference in 1998 necessitates caution. The footnote states that:
"[slome delegations expressed reservations on the conclusions of the
Preparatory Committee and felt that these conclusions do not prejudge
the position of the States in the General Assembly."
27
The lack of imperative to complete its work by April 1998 in the
language of the recommendation to the 1996 PrepCom raises concerns.
It raises the prospect that the 1997-98 PrepCom work could delay the
convening of the conference in June 1998. The wording of the General
Assembly resolution is not sufficiently peremptory to concentrate the
minds of delegates to bring the process to end by April 1998. This
prospect may offer opponents of the court a method by which to delay
the outcome. Nevertheless, the General Assembly's resolution is quite
specific.28 It mandates the 1997-98 PrepCom:
(a) to meet three or four times up to a total of 9 weeks before the dip-
lomatic conference. To organize its work so that it will finalize its work
in April of 1998 and so as to allow the widest possible participation of
States. The work should be done in the form of open-ended working
25. G.A. Res. 50/46, supra note 23, at para. 2.
26. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at para. 370.
27. Id. vol. 1, at 77, n.12.
28. Report of the Sixth Committee on the Establishment of an International Crimi-
nal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., agenday item 147, UN Doc. A/51/627 (1996). This res-
olution was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 17, 1996.
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groups, concentrating on the negotiation of proposals with a view of
producing a widely acceptable draft consolidated text of a convention,
to be submitted to the diplomatic conference. No simultaneous meet-
ings of the Working Groups shall be held. The working groups should
be fully transparent and should be by general agreement to secure the
universality of the convention. Submission of reports of its debates will
not be required. Interpretation and translation services will be availa-
ble to the working groups.
(b) The subjects to be dealt with by the Preparatory Committee are:
1. List and definition and elements of crimes
2. Principles of criminal law and penalties
3. Organization of the court
4. Procedures
5. Complementarity and trigger mechanism
6. Cooperation with States
7. Establishment of the ICC and relationship with the UN
8. Final clauses and financial matters
9. Other matters
The renewed mandate of the 1997-98 PrepCom is a more positive,
goal oriented statement than that of the 1996 PrepCom, and it en-
hances the prospects for successful progression to the negotiation stage
of the process.
29
6. It must be emphasized that all the language necessary for the
creation of an acceptable consolidated statute has been adopted in the
1996 General Assembly resolution. At this stage, a genuine and disci-
plined drafting effort is necessary in 1997-98 in order to fully exploit
the opportunities offered by the General Assembly's positive mandate
to the PrepCom. As explained below, limited member drafting groups
would be a positive way to allow focussing on creation of an acceptable
text. However, the fact that the General Assembly resolution refers to
the use of open-ended working groups means that a more diversified
effort must be made to avoid the shortcomings that have been in evi-
dence in the 1996 PrepCom. To this end, the role of the chairs of the
working groups is vital, as is the role of the Bureau. A positive and
genuine drafting effort to consolidate the various proposals is, there-
fore, required.
II. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
7. A successful drafting undertaking of this nature is not easily
achieved with open-ended multiple working groups. Problems have
hindered this process in the past, such as: lack of broader participation
due to under-representation of Member-States; the fact that some dele-
gations have only one representative who has responsibilities broader




deal with all the technical issues that must be addressed by the work-
ing groups; and the fact that some delegations lack sufficient expertise
in the the complexities of the subject matter.
8. While a limited and fixed membership for each working group
would be the most efficient method to produce within a relatively short
period of time, a satisfactory text, equivalent results must be achieved
using the broader system envisaged by the 1996 resolution. So far, the
work of the 1996 PrepCom has been on the basis of open participation
to all member States, and all decisions have been made by consensus.
That process has been important as a method of exchanging views and
clarifying issues. But it has not been effective as a drafting process.
The forthcoming 1997-1998 PrepCom must therefore change focus,
method, and speed of work. This will depend on the dynamics of each
working group and on the choice and expertise, as to subject matter, of
the working groups' chairs.
9. It should also be noted that some Member-States, particularly
among the less developed countries, may not be represented at the
1997-98 PrepCom, due to their lack of sufficient personnel and due to
the costs of attending the PrepCom. The absence of these governments'
delegations at the PrepCom is deleterious to the objective of making
this effort truly universal. It will also make it more difficult at a later
time, to induce these governments to become parties to the Convention
establishing the ICC. Thus, some efforts should be made to ensure the
participation of these governments through contributions to the special
fund which the 1996 resolution for the establishment of an ICC re-
quests the Secretary-General to establish for that purpose.30
10. To avoid some of the difficulties that have affected the
PrepCom and the Ad Hoc Committee, the chair's proposed plan is to
have two working groups each day but alternating between morning
and afternoon so that governments with small delegations can partici-
pate in all working groups and so that all working groups will have si-
multaneous interpretation.
11. The Chair's latest informally proposed schedule is as follows:
31
SESSION 1 - FEBRUARY 10-21, 1997
30. 1996 Sixth Committee Report, supra note 28, at para. 7.
31. This working programme for the first two sessions of the PrepCom was circu-
lated by the Chairman to the Permanent Missions to the United Nations on November
15, 1996. As is customary, it is a draft, and will be proposed to the Plenary for its ap-
proval. The working program for the third session of 1997 is still under consideration.
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Week 1 Opening with a plenary meeting
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Sessions Afternoon Sessions
-List and definitions and elements of -Principles of criminal law and
crimes, penalties.
Week 2
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Session Afternoon Session
-List and definitions and elements of -Principles of criminal law and
crimes. penalties.
-Procedures (if time permits).
Closing session in a plenary meeting.
SESSION 2 - AUGUST 4-15, 1997
Week 1 Opening with a plenary meeting in Week 1
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Session Afternoon Session
-Complementarity and trigger -Procedures
mechanisms.
Week 2
Working Group 1 Working Group 2
Morning Session Afternoon Session
-Complementarity and trigger -Procedures
mechanisms.
-Organization of the Court.
III. CATEGORIES OF DRAFTING ISSUES
12. The drafting issues facing the 1997-98 PrepCom fall into three
categories. They are:
(a) Parts of the Statute involving technical and substantially
technical issues;
(b) Parts of the Statute involving a mix of political judgments
and technical issues; and
(c) Parts of the Statute involving political judgments.
Each one of these parts presents a different set of problems and draft-
ing progress. Each one of these parts will, therefore, have to be dealt
with in such a way as to address those differences. Following is an as-
sessment of the expected progress on the various parts of the statute,
in light of the experiences of the 1996 PrepCom, and based on the
above three categories of drafting issues.
VOL. 25:2
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A. Parts Involving Technical and Substantially Technical Issues
1. Rules of Procedure and Evidence
32
13. At the second session of the 1996 PrepCom an informal work-
ing group was established. It used a text presented by Australia and
the Netherlands 33 as a basis for its work. The working group then re-
ceived a significantly large number of additional proposals and amend-
ments and this caused that part of the text to become unmanageable.
A different approach is however needed in 1997-98 because the goal is
not to produce a comprehensive code of criminal procedure and evi-
dence with extensive details. Instead, the approach should be to de-
velop in the statute, general principles of procedure and evidence,
while an annex could contain more detailed provisions. The annex
would expressly have the character of guidelines, and hence not be
deemed of the same order as the rest of the Statute. Equally, the Stat-
ute could provide that this annex could be amended by the Committee
of States Parties on the recommendation of the ICC. This approach
would also open the way for the ICC to develop rules of court to sup-
plement the rules of procedure and evidence on the basis of the ICC's
future experience. Since Rules of Court would be subject to the ap-
proval of the Committee of States Parties, there should be no appre-
hension that the ICC would act with total independence on such a
quasi-legislative undertaking. This approach would make the 1997-98
PrepCom's work on this part of the Statute more fruitful.
14. In 1997-98 this working group would benefit from the partici-
pation of delegates with specific expertise in comparative criminal pro-
cedure, and with an understanding of the particularities of interna-
tional criminal investigations and prosecution of international criminal
cases.
2. Organization of the Court"
15. Some progress was achieved on this part at the second session
of the 1996 PrepCom. An examination of the written proposals and re-
32. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 47-61, vol. II,
at 150-234.
33. Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 12 - 30 Aug. 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.249/L.2
(1996). A meeting was held July 11-13, 1996, at the International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences which was attended by 34 experts acting in their individ-
ual capacities from 20 countries. These experts were delegates to the 1997 Prep Com.
The meeting was also attended by NGO observers. Three texts were produced and are
referred to hereinafter. The draft text on Rules of Procedure and Evidence was prepared
by Australia and presented to the July 1996 Siracusa group of experts. On the basis of
observations and discussions during that meeting, Australia updated the text and sub-
mitted it to the Second Session where an informal working group was established to re-
view it as well as other submissions.
34. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 11-15, vol. II,
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view of the oral statements made by delegations at the 1996 PrepCom
indicates that most of the delegations' intended textual proposals have
been made. This should therefore expedite the work of that working
group in 1997. Some basic issues however may not be fully resolved in
1997 because of their political judgments content. The 1997 delegates
may not have sufficient instructions from their governments to make
such judgments or they may be instructed to defer these choices to a
later time, including possibly the diplomatic conference. This situation
could delay reaching a consensus on this part, but without necessarily
delaying the drafting which could have alternative bracketed texts.
These issues include: (a) the number of judges and the method of their
appointment; (b) the qualifications and method of appointing the pros-
ecutor; (c) the permanent presence of all judges at the seat of the
Court; (d) the role and powers of what the ILC's 1994 draft refers to as
"The Presidency;" (e) the enactment of rules of court; and (f) (which is
probably the most important of all these issues) the role and responsi-
bilities of the Committee of States Parties. The question of the Com-
mittee of States Parties has not yet been adequately addressed by the
1995 Ad Hoc Committee and the 1996 PrepCom. It is further dis-
cussed below at paragraphs 36 and 37. The above issues, with the ex-
ception of (f), have a lower political judgment content than other issues
discussed below and thus, it may be possible to make significant pro-
gress in 1997-98 on this part.
16. The International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul Uni-
versity has prepared a study into the Financial and Administrative
Implications of the ICC which follows in this publication. This study is
based on the experiences of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals, and
the Commissions of Experts that preceded them. The facts and figures
presented are based on the discussions of the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee
and the 1996 PrepCom.
17. In this context, it is necessary to mention one further issue
which has not yet been dealt with by the 1996 PrepCom. This is
whether the appeals chamber of the Tribunal will give a single, col-
legiate judgment, or whether each judge will have the right to give his
or her own separate opinion, including dissenting or concurring opin-
ions with the majority. The detrimental consequences of a relatively
large number of broadly dissenting opinions is well illustrated by the
effect which the appeal decisions in the Tadic35 case before the ICTFY
had on the jurisprudence of that Tribunal. The disparity between the
various appeal judge's conclusions, and between the arguments which
they used to reach those conclusions, did not serve well the develop-
ment of a coherent jurisprudential basis for the Tribunal. If the juris-
at 7-54.
35. The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72 (2 Oct 1995), Decision of
the Appeals Chamber on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, 1996.
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prudence of the ICC is to become similarly fractured due to the num-
ber and diversity of opinions given by the members of its appeals
chamber, this could create difficulties for the development of interna-
tional criminal law. Alternatively, the argument can be made that a
plurality of opinions helps to develop the law of the system. With this
in mind, it is proposed that the appeals chamber initially give single,
collegiate judgments, but once the Committee of States Parties is satis-
fied that the jurisprudence has developed sufficiently, it can decide to
allow individual dissenting and concurring opinions. This question
should be reviewed by the Committee of States Parties after the first
five years of the ICC's existence.
3. General Principles of Criminal Law
36
18. Progress has been made at the second session of the 1996
PrepCom by the informal working group on this part which relied es-
sentially on a text submitted by Canada. 37 Several other exhaustive
proposals have been made by France and Japan, and it is not likely
that new proposals of a substantially different nature will be made in
1997-98. That working group will however face some difficult doctrinal
legal questions and will need to bridge the gaps between different le-
gal systems. A balance between legal and diplomatic expertise which
will allow progress on that specialized issue will be needed on that
working group. Some substantive legal issues pertaining to this part
will however depend on the resolution of certain political judgment is-
sues and the working group would have to prepare some alternate
bracketed texts. The major issues that are likely to arise are in con-
nection with: (a) recognition of penal judgments; (b) double jeopardy or
non bis in idem; (c) the mental element for each of the four crimes
presently deemed to be within the inherent jurisdiction of the Court;
and (d) penalties.
19. As to issues concerning (a) and (b), the relevant textual provi-
sions will depend on political judgment issues concerning "complemen-
tarity" and the relationship of the ICC to national criminal jurisdic-
tions, and more particularly whether the ICC will have "primacy" in
that relationship. The two issues needing particular attention are: (c)
the mental element and (d) penalties. As to (c) the mental element, it
seems necessary to develop not only generally applicable provisions,
but also specific provisions on the mental element required for each of
36. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 41-47, vol. II,
at 79-104.
37. Applicable Law and General Principle of Law: Working Paper Submitted by Ca-
nada, Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 12-30 Aug. 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., UN Doc. A/AC.249/L.4.
The draft Canadian text was presented at the July Siracusa meeting of experts where it
was discussed. Canada then made the appropriate changes based on the Siracusa discus-
sions and submitted the text at the second session.
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the crimes within the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC. This is necessi-
tated by the diversity of these crimes and their peculiarities in light of
their history and development. Furthermore, as to the four crimes
presently contemplated to be within the inherent jurisdiction of the
ICC, the particularized mental element as to each of these crimes
should also distinguish between what is required for decision-makers
and what is required for executors, down to the lowest echelons of the
chain of command.
20. As to (d) penalties, the Statute should contain principles and
guidelines for penalties, leaving to the ICC the initiative of proposing
specific penalties provisions to the Committee of States Parties for ap-
proval, within the basic principles and guidelines set forth in the Stat-
ute. That will facilitate the 1997-98 PrepCom's task and at the same
time insure a more reflective and deliberate set of penalties which will
have the benefit of the ICC's expertise.
21. Because of the highly technical nature of this part, the work-
ing group should avoid ambiguous textual language, which may pro-
duce acceptable compromise results at the 1997-98 PrepCom but which
would, because of their lack of precision, create future difficulties. The
more this working group accomplishes, the less burden will fall on the
diplomatic conference which will be more concerned with other issues
involving political judgments and may not, therefore, be adequately
prepared to deal with the complicated technical issues presented by
this part. Notwithstanding the above, this working group is antici-
pated to proceed well and to produce a text with bracketed provisions
for unresolved questions.
22. There are a number of other issues that should be mentioned
at this point. The 1996 PrepCom has accepted the position that the
ICC's jurisdiction will be solely prospective. This is a major concession
which may create the impression that the four core crimes of the ICC's
jurisdiction are not punishable before the establishment of the ICC.
Such a perception would be incorrect, and would seriously undermine
the efforts of some states to prosecute violators within their own na-
tional legal systems. Hence, it would be useful to include a provision in
the statute to avoid the implications of an interpretation that would
lead to the conclusion that past violators cannot be prosecuted before
national tribunals.
23. Another danger to be avoided is the implication that statutes
of limitation can apply to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide. This is contrary to the 1968 UN Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity,3 8 and the 1974 European Convention on the Non-
38. United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Nov. 6, 1968, 754 U.N.T.S. 73, 8 I.L.M. 68
(entered into force Nov. 11, 1970).
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Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes.m Therefore, it must be clear that while the ICC will
only deal with crimes which occur after its establishment; it does not
imply that national legal systems cannot prosecute such crimes under
the theory of universality or other theories, or that statutes of limita-
tions can apply to genocide, crimes against humanity and to war
crimes. Indeed these are crimes contemplated to be within the inher-
ent jurisdiction of the ICC, are jus cogens and create obligations erga
omnes.
B. Parts Involving Substantially Mixed Political and Technical Issues
1. Rules of Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance
4°
24. While this part appears to be essentially technical, and it is, it
nonetheless depends on a fundamental political judgment concerning
the relationship of the ICC to States Parties and to other States. If the
Court is deemed to have "primacy" over national systems (like the
ICTFY41 and the ICTR42), the framework of cooperation will be sub-
stantially different than if the ICC is deemed to be the equivalent of
any other State engaging in bilateral relations. One of the proposals
currently before the PrepCom concerning the relationship between the
ICC and States Parties places the ICC at the same level as any State
engaging in bilateral relations with another State concerning inter-
state cooperation in penal matters. That approach presents serious
problems of enforcement for the ICC. It must be emphasized that in
order for the ICC to be effective it should have "primacy" on the basis
of the provisions of the Statute.
25. The 1996 PrepCom established an informal working group on
this part and considered a text submitted by South Africa and
Lesotho.4 Understandably, this working group did not resolve the po-
litical judgment question raised above which affects the overall struc-
ture of this part and it is unlikely that the 1997-98 PrepCom will be
able to do so. However, if the drafting continues on the premise that
the ICC does not have "primacy" over the national legal systems of the
States Parties, it will make the whole scheme of cooperation only as
39. European Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes, Jan. 25, 1974, E.T.S. No. 82.
40. See Report of the Preparatoty Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 68-74, vol. II,
at 245-85.
41. ICTFY Statute, supra note 8, art. 9.
42. ICTR Statute, supra note 10, arts. 8 & 9.
43. International Cooperation and Judicial (Mutual) Assistance: Working Paper Sub-
mitted by South Africa and Lesotho, Draft Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 12-30 Aug. 1996, U.N. GAOR, 51st
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/L.5. The draft of that text was prepared for the July 1996
Siracusa meeting of experts where it was discussed. Thereafter, South Africa made the
appropriate changes and the text was presented at the Prep Corn's Second Session.
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good as the national laws and practices of each State Party (since the
Court would have to go through the procedures of each State Party in
accordance with the laws of each State Party). If this approach
prevails, it may turn out to be the Achilles Heel of the ICC. Some new
and imaginative ideas are therefore necessary in order to avoid the
sensitivity expressed by some governments concerning the "primacy"
approach reflected in the Statutes of the ICTFY" and ICTR45 and yet
avoid placing the ICC in a subordinate position to national legal sys-
tems. The working group should, therefore, prepare alternative texts
in brackets to allow the Diplomatic Conference to make an easy selec-
tion so that the Diplonatic Conference does not have to engage in pro-
longed drafting that would repeat the discussions of the 1996, and pre-
sumably the 1997-98 PrepCom's work, thus delaying its conclusion.
C. Parts Involving Political Judgments
1. Nature of the ICC4
26. The ICC is to be an international treaty-created body. The
Convention will govern the relations of the new institution and State
Parties, as well as the relations between the ICC and the UN. This
seems to be a policy choice which may not necessarily be the best one
to make. The benefits of establishing an international criminal justice
system as an integral part of the United Nations system, such as the
International Court of Justice, outweigh all the perceived negative im-
plications of the UN's bureaucracy and its present financial difficulties.
But that policy choice which emerged from the deliberations of the Ad
Hoc Committee and the 1996 PrepCom may hopefully still be subject
to reconsideration, although that prospect appears doubtful.
2. Naming
47
27. The ICC should more appropriately be named the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal because the Court is the adjudicating or judi-
cial organ of the institution. To refer to the Court as the entire institu-
tion and also to the Court as the judicial organ within the institution
can create unnecessary confusion. This was the Choice of the Security
Council when it established the ICTFY and the ICTR.
44. See ICTFY Statute, supra note 8, art. 9 (which provides for primacy).
45. See ICTR statute, supra note 8, arts. 8 & 9 (which provide for primacy).
46. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 8-9, vol. II, at 3-6.
47. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft Statute International Criminal Tribu-
nal, 9 & 10 NOUVELLES 9TUDES PENALES (1993).
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3. Relationship between the ICC and National Jurisdictions8
28. The 1995 Ad Hoc Committee 49 and 1996 PrepCom ° selected
the term "complementarity" to characterize the nature of the ICC and
its relationship to national legal systems. This term is an English
transposition of the French term complementaritg. But to know the ori-
gin of that term does not necessarily contribute to the clarity of its
meaning, nor the specificity of its import. Some see it as jurisdiction-
sharing concept to be amplified, such as the Maastricht Treaty l con-
cept of "subsidiarity" which does not detract from the primacy of the
Treaty of European Union. Others see the term "complementarity" as
meaning that the ICC can be seized with a matter only after national
jurisdictions have agreed to it or whenever said jurisdictions are una-
ble to act fairly and effectively. Complementarity should not however
be interpreted in a way that places the ICC in a subsidiary position to
national criminal justice systems. To do so might frustrate the pur-
poses and work of the ICC.
29. There are four core international crimes which are to be the
ICC's inherent subject-matter jurisdiction:52 "aggression;" "genocide;"
"crimes against humanity;" and "war crimes." These are crimes that af-
fect or have the potential of affecting the peace and security of human-
kind, that shock the universal human conscience, and that are deemed
part of jus cogens. Prosecuting violators of these crimes is therefore as
much the separate task of States as it is the collective task of the in-
ternational community. Such prosecutions and the enforcement of judi-
cial orders and judgments inherent thereto will require the action and
cooperation of all States Parties. Thus, these crimes are best suited to
be within the inherent jurisdiction of the ICC, even if national jurisdic-
tions are given, whenever appropriate, the opportunity to act. In this
respect, the formula adopted in the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTFY)s3 in Articles 9 and 10,
constitutes one of the models to draw upon.54 Quite clearly, the ques-
tion of primacy of the ICC, and how it is to be exercised, has to be
resolved.
30. "Complementarity" is a useful concept to draw upon in deter-
mining the relationship of the ICC and national legal institutions, but
48. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, vol. I, at 36-41, vol. II, at
55-78.
49. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 6-10, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (1995).
[hereinafter Report of the Ad Hoc Committee].
50. See UN Doc. A/51/22, supra note 1.
51. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EuROPAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J.(C 224) 191 (1992).
52. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 49; see also Report of the Pre-
paratory Committee, supra note 1.
53. UN Doc. SJRES/835.
54. See generally BASSiOUNI, supra note 8.
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it is not useful in respect of the relationship between the ICC and the
Security Council. Indeed, the Council may refer matters to the ICC,
and may be called upon to enforce ICC decisions. Thus, the relation-
ship between the ICC and the Security Council must necessarily be ar-
ticulated on a different basis than that on which the relationship be-
tween the ICC and the national jurisdiction is established. However,
this does not exclude a differentiated approach concerning each crime.
That differentiated approach should be reflected in the Jurisdictional
Triggering Mechanisms.55
31. States Parties to the convention establishing an ICC will have
to cede some jurisdiction to the ICC, and to give effect to the orders
and judgments of the Court. Jurisdictional cession and the recognition
of orders and judgments of an international judicial organ by domestic
legal orders will depend on national constitutions' limitations and
other aspects of national ordre public. But this should not be a way by
which to stifle the work and judgments of the ICC. Furthermore, there
should not be any significant disparity in the relationship between the
ICC and each and every State Party. Otherwise, the ICC's judgemnts
and orders will lack uniformity of enforcement and that will affect the
fairness and effectiveness of the system as a whole.
32. Some member-States may deem the ICC an extension of their
own national judicial systems. Others can characterize it as an alter-
native judicial body or another forum to which cases can be ceded to or
transferred as in the model of the European Convention on Transfer of
proceedings in Criminal Matters. 56 Each State Party will have to ac-
commodate its participation in this new international judicial system
in a manner that is more consonant with the requirements of its own
national legal system, but without sacrifice to the equal and fair treat-
ment of ICC judgments.
4. Definition of the Crimes57
33. On the basis of the Ad Hoc Committee's Report58 and the 1996
PrepCom Report,59 the following appears to be the likelihood of the
1997-98 PrepCom's direction.
Aggression - Whether aggression is included, how it is defined, and
whether only the Security Council will be able to refer a situation in-
55. See infra.
56. European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters 1972,
73 European Treaty Series. See Ekkehart Muller-Rappard, The European System, in IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
57. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Draft International Criminal Code and
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal (1987).
58. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee, supra note 49.
59. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1.
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volving aggression to the ICC is an essentially political judgment ques-
tion which is so far not entirely resolved.
Irrespective of the policy question about its inclusion as a crime
within the ICC's inherent jurisdiction, "aggression" needs to be de-
fined. The 1974 General Assembly consensus resolution 6° can be a ba-
sis for the definition, but it is clearly unsatisfactory with respect to
providing the necessary elements required by the principles of legality,
and individual as opposed to State responsibility. Thus, this category
of crimes will require the greatest attention and work in the formula-
tion of its definition and legal elements. At the First Session of the
1996 PrepCom, a chairman's text was presented with the Bureau's full
support, and certain delegations added proposals which appear in a
compiled text in the 1996 PrepCom Report.
61
Genocide - It seems settled that Genocide will be part of the ICC's in-
herent jurisdiction and that it will be defined as stated in Article 2 of
the 1948 Genocide Convention. 62 But that definition nonetheless has
several flaws: (i) it does not include social and political groups among
those protected; (ii) the genocidal acts protecting a certain group seem
to address only an entire homogenous group and do not specifically
cover groups within a group (for example, the intellectual elite); (iii)
the specific intent requirement makes its proof very difficult and it
seems geared only to perpetrators who are part of the highest echelons
of the decision-making process; and (iv) there is no stated intent re-
quirement for perpetrators who carry out superiors' orders that result
in or are part of a policy or plan to commit genocide.
Notwithstanding the above, the 1996 PrepCom's discussions re-
vealed a reluctance to alter the terms of Article 2 of the Genocide Con-
vention6 and it is unlikely to change in 1997. But some language in
the Commentary or in some other text could allow the ICC's jurispru-
dence to fill these legislative gaps in light of the law and jurisprudence
of the ICTFY and ICTR.
Crimes Against Humanity" - It also seems settled that this category
of international crimes will be part of the ICC's inherent jurisdiction.
Its definition is not, however, settled. Article 6(c) of the IMT6 and 5(c)
IMTFE6 6 define that category of crimes as does Article 5 of the
60. See Generally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Benjamin Ferencz, The Crime Against
Peace, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CRImINAL LAw (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986).
61. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1.
62. United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1 UN GAOR Res. 96 (Dec. 11, 1946).
63. See Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1, at 17.
64. See generally M. CHERiF BAssIouNi, CRIMEs AGAINST HuMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRImiNAL LAW (1992).
65. 82 U.N.T.S. 279, supra note 14.
66. T.IA.S. No. 1589, supra note 15.
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ICTFY67 and Article 3 of the ICTR s."6 All four definitions vary slightly
however, and all four of them have some general and vague terms that
need to be clarified. The following concerns have been raised in 1995
and 1996 need to be addressed: (i) rape and sexual assault should be
specifically included (as in the case of Article 5 of ICTFY); (ii) "exter-
mination," "deportation" and "enslavement" need to be clarified; (iii)
"other inhumane acts" needs to be clarified or narrowed to mean noth-
ing more than an interpretation ejusdem generis; (iv) the mental ele-
ment has to be specified with a distinction between decision-makers
and executors (preferably in the same way as with the intent require-
ments for "genocide," though bearing in mind that "crimes against hu-
manity" presently requires a general intent and not a specific intent
for all categories of perpetrators).
At the First Session of the 1996 PrepCom a Chairman's draft was
introduced with full support of the Bureau. Several delegations made
additional proposals. The compiled text appears in Volume II of the
1996 PrepCom Report. But the divergences between these proposals
need to be reconciled.
Notwithstanding the problems raised above, "crimes against hu-
manity" and the articulation of its elements do not pose any difficult
drafting problems and could be accomplished with relative ease.
War Crimes6 9 - The deliberations of the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee and
the 1996 PrepCom revealed that the ILC's attempted distinction be-
tween "serious crimes against the laws and customs of war" and "grave
breaches of the Geneva Convention" was not felicitous. The so-called
"Law of the Hague" and "Law of Geneva" are in some respects so inter-
twined that it is neither appropriate nor feasible to make the type of
distinction made by the ILC, particularly since that category of crimes
is aimed at providing a comprehensive definition on the basis of which
combatants may face international criminal prosecution. "War Crimes"
must therefore be an appropriate combination of the "Law of Geneva"
and the "Law of the Hague" in connection with conflicts of an interna-
tional character and conflicts of a non-international character. This
includes:
(i) "grave breaches" of the 1949 Conventions and Protocol 1,70 as
well as violations of Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions 71
67. SC Res. 808, supra note 8.
68. SC Res. 935, UN. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3400th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/935 (1994).
69. See generally HOwARD LEViE, TERRORiSM AND WAR CrMEs.
70. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
UN.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
71. Common Article 3 to: Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention No.1), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 US.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention of the Amelioration of the Condition of




(ii) whether to define the customary law of armed conflicts in some
general terms, adding some specifics, or alternatively to make only
make a general reference to the laws and customs of war with
some specifics as in the case of ICTFY73 Articles 2 & 3. But that
approach may violate the principles of legality in many legal sys-
tems. Thus, a well-defined provision is more advisable than a gen-
eral statement purporting to incorporate by reference the custom-
ary law of armed conflicts. In either case, that part of the "war
crimes" provision will necessarily be more general than the provi-
sion dealing with the "Law of Geneva," and thus less responsive to
the requirements of legality in some States.
5. Jurisdictional Triggering Mechanisms for the Four Core
Crimes within the Inherent Jurisdiction of the ICC
34. On the assumption that a diversified approach is elected by
the 1997 PrepCom, the following may be considered:
(a) Aggression: The Security Council and a State Party may refer a
situation to the ICC for investigation by the Prosecutor and determi-
nation of whether a person may be prosecuted for such a crime. The
Prosecutor may refer a given individual case if it is deemed to be in
the best interests of justice, but subject to the approval of the Indict-
ment Chamber. If a case is pending before a national criminal jurisdic-
tion, at the request of the Prosecutor, the Indictment Chamber would
either ask a State to defer to it the investigation or prosecution of such
a crime. However, such a procedure would not be allowed if the situa-
tion was initiated by the Prosecutor without the Council's approval.
There should also be textual language in the Statute designed to avoid
conflict between the ICC, the Security Council, and the ICJ.
(b) Genocide: Initiation of the prosecutorial phase can be by a
State Party or the Security Council and also by any State Party to the
Genocide Convention. Deferral procedure and waiver of ICC jurisdic-
tion would be the same as for "Aggression."
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: Same as for "Genocide."
(d) War Crimes: Same as for "Genocide" and "Crimes Against Hu-
manity," but with the added formula that State Parties whose armed
forces are part of a UN or regional organization multinational force, or
are on a peace-keeping force sanctioned by the Security Council or any
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 US.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention No.III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 UN.T.S.
135; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the Time of War (Ge-
neva Convention No.IV), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
72. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.TS. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1997).
73. UN Doc. SIRES808, supra note 8.
1997
DENV. J. INVL L. & POL'Y
other regional organization are first subject to the jurisdiction of the
national military justice of that State under whose flag the alleged
perpetrator acted. Additionally, if the individual legislation is not part
of the policy, a consistent practice of the armed forces to which the ac-
cused belonged, the national military justice system would have pri-
macy. The only exception would be wherever the national military jus-
tice system of that State is demonstrably unable or unwilling to act. In
this case, the Prosecutor can request the Indictment Chamber to act
before the ICC.
6. Institutional Relations Issues
35. There are two issues that arise in this context:
a. The role of the Committee of States Parties
36. The structure of the 1979 draft statute to enforce the
Apartheid Convention 74 envisaged the inclusion of a Committee of
State Parties. In article XVIII of the statute, it is referred to as the
'Standing-Committee.7 5 This body had a role in electing officials, deter-
mining the annual budget, ensuring compliance with court judge-
ments, and conducting general administrative oversight. The 1992 In-
ternational Law Commission Report on the creation of an
international criminal court draft statute included a similar body. It
was left out of the ILC's 1994 draft statute in an attempt to distin-
guish the ICC statute from that of the Apartheid Convention. In the
Updated Siracusa Draft,76 Proposed Article 5(e) envisages "a standing
Committee of States Parties" as one of the Articles of the ICC. Pro-
posed Article C creates a Standing Committee of States Parties con-
sisting of one member for each of the States Parties, electing officers
by a simple majority, and meeting at least two times each year for at
least a week each time. Regarding the role of the Committee in the
Updated Siracusa Draft:
Article 4. The Standing Committee shall have the power to perform
the functions expressly assigned to it under this Convention, plus
any other functions that it determines appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Tribunal that are not inconsistent with the
Convention, but in no way shall those functions impair the inde-
pendence and integrity of the Court [Tribunal] as a judicial body.
74. APARThEiD STATuTE, supra note 4.
75. Id. art. XVIII.
76. In June 1995, a group of experts acting in their individual capacity convened at
the International Institute of Higher Studies in the Criminal Sciences (ISISC - Siracusa)
to contribute alternative and supplemental text to the International Law Commission's
1994 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court. The outcome of the meeting was
the 'Updated Siracusa Draft' which was presented to the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court. See also 9 & 10 NOuvELLES 9TUDES
PENALES with translation into French and Spanish.
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Article 5. In particular, the Standing Committee may:
a. offer to mediate disputes between States Parties relating to the
functions of the Tribunal;
b. encourage States to accede to the Convention; and
c. propose to States Parties international instruments to enhance
the functions of the Tribunal.
Article 6. The Standing Committee may exclude from participation
representatives of States Parties that have failed to provide financial
support for the Tribunal as required by this Statute or States Parties
that failed to carry out their obligations under this Statute
Article 7. Upon request by the Procuracy, or by a party to a case
presented for adjudication to a chamber of the Court, the Standing
Committee may be seized with a mediation and conciliation petition.
In that case, the Standing Committee shall within 60 days decide on
granting or denying that petition, from which decision there is no ap-
peal. In the event that the Standing Committee grants the petition,
Court proceedings shall be stayed until such time as the Standing
Committee concludes its mediation and conciliation efforts, but not for
more than one year except by stipulation of the parties and with the
consent of the Court.
37. The role that the committee had in the 1992 ILC draft statute
structure has not been adequately filled in the 1994 ILC model. In or-
der to properly and effectively deal with the relevant issues, the com-
mittee should be re-established in the structure before the end of the
PrepCom sessions. There is an potential problem to be settled in re-
gard to the committee of States Parties and the law of treaties. The
statute should clarify the binding nature of decisions of the committee,
even with regard to such things as the possible adoption of new treaty
crimes into the jurisdiction of the court in the future. Were a negative
vote in the Committee of States Parties to be interpreted as equivalent
to a treaty reservation, this would lead to unnecessary problems in ju-
risdiction over international or transnational crime.
b. The relationship of the ICC to the UN
38. It is far more beneficial to have the ICC as a separate body
but part of the UN system, as opposed to a completely unrelated body
with a treaty relationship to the UN. Neither the implications of the
choice at hand or the nature of the relationship have been adequately
discussed by the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee or the 1996 PrepCom. Be-
cause this is such a complex issue there is a danger in relegating it to
the end of the 1997-98 PrepCom's work. Early discussion with senior
UN officials to ascertain the method and means by which either of
these options could be implemented is therefore necessary.
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c. Financing the ICC77
39. This issue has been briefly addressed by the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee and the 1996 PrepCom. Three options can be identified from these
discussions. The first is that the budget of the Court should come di-
rectly from the regular budget of the UN. But that depends on the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal's relationship to the UN. The arguments
used to support this position are that this would give the new institu-
tion a definite and dependable source of finance, and would avoid the
problems that other directly financed bodies have faced. It would also
encourage more States to ratify the Statute of the court, as there
would be no significant financial cost involved. The second option is
that the Court be funded directly by the States Parties either on a pro-
rata basis, or on the basis of some other assessment system such as
the UN assessment formula, where each member pays according to the
size of their economy, or the International Postal Union assessment
formula where assessments are calculated on the basis of a number of
categories of States (e.g., five), with each category receiving an increas-
ing number of shares, on the basis of which they pay a proportion of
the budget. The latter system is advocated on the basis that it allows
the size of the economy of a State to be taken into account, but pre-
vents overdependence on any single contributor. Proponents of the tier
system also argue that the precarious state of UN finances means that
it could not properly support the ICC. The third proposal is a form of
combination of the previous two approaches. There have been many
proposals regarding different forms of combination. There is general
support for a mechanism by which voluntary contributions can be
made to the coffers of the court in order to augment the regular in-
come. Some have argued that the complainant State should be re-
quired to pay some of the costs of any case that results from their
complaint, but there has been widespread disapproval of this. There
has also been the proposal that the Security Council budget pay for
any case that it brings to the court. The PrepCom should deal with
this issue bearing in mind the needs of the Court, or at least reduce
the broad proposals which have been made to bracketed texts which
can then be dealt with at the conference of diplomats.
IV. CONCLUSION
40. A number of delegations have also met regularly during the
1996 PrepCom sessions, and once inter-sessionally. This group of dele-
gations which is known as the "like-minded States" have been a signif-
icant driving force behind the ICC's momentum. Their contributions
77. See generally Daniel Mac Sweeney, Prospects for the financing of an Interna-
tional Criminal Court, Discussion paper of the World Federalist Movement, UNI NGO.
See also Thomas Warrick, Organization of the International Criminal Court: Administra-
tive and Financial Implications, 25 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POLY'333.
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have been effective and constructive. This group, which has benefitted
from the hospitality of the Canadian mission, has been growing in
number. At the November meeting of the Sixth Committee, it included:
Australia, Austria, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Den-
mark, Egypt, Finland, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Lesotho, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sa-
moa, Slovakia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and
Tobago (representing 12 Caricon States), Uruguay, and Venezuela. Par-
ticipation by other delegations is expected to increase in 1997-98.
41. Significant progress that has been made since the ILC
presented its draft 1994 statute. Non-Governmental Organizations,
and particularly the 'NGO Coalition for an ICC'78 have played an im-
portant and useful part in the process. Their contributions have taken
the form of aiding the PrepCom through publishing expert NGO pa-
pers which contributed to a deeper understanding of the issues, and
78. NGO Coalition for an ICC participating organizations as of November 1996 are:
African Law Students - Young Lawyers Association, All Saints Newman Center, AL-
TERLAW, American Bar Association, Amnesty International, Avocats Sans Frontieres,
B'nai B'rith International, Baha'i International Community, Campaign for Tibet, Cana-
dian Network for an International Criminal Court, Carter Center, Center for Civil
Human Rights, Center for develoment of International Law, Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy, Center for UN Reform Education, Center for Women's Global Leader-
ship, Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations, Counselling and Mediation Center,
Crusade Against Violence, Drug Free Society, Egyptian Organization for Human Rights,
Equality Now, European Law Students Association, European Peace Movement, Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church in America, Federation Internationale des Ligues Droits de
1'Hommes, FN-Forbundet/Danish UNA, Global Policy Forum, Guatemala Human Rights
Commission/USA, Helsinki Citizens Assembly, Human Rights Internet, Human Rights
Watch, Humanitarian Law Center, International Law Association (US Branch) Commit-
tee on an International Criminal Court, Institute for the study of Genocide, Istituto
Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali, Interkeekelyk Vredesberaad, Interna-
tional Bar Association, International Commission of Jurists, International Human
Rights Law Group, International Human Rights Law Institute - DePaul University
School of Law, International Indian Treaty Council, International League for Human
Rights, International Service for Human Rights, International Society for Human
Rights, International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, International Committee for
the Convention against Microwave Weapons, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, League of Human Rights, Legal Aid for Women
and Environmental Development, Leo Kuper Foundation, Manobik Unnayan Parishad,
Maryknol Society Justice and Peace Office, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP, No Peace Without Justice (TRP), Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,
Nurnberger Menschenrecthszentrum, Ordre des Avocats a la Cour de Paris, Organiza-
tion for Defending Victims of Violence, Pace Peace Centre, Pace Law School, Parli-
mentarians for Global Action, Procedural Aspects of International Law Institute, Quaker
U.N. Office, Redress, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights, SOS
Balkanes, Syracuse University, The People's Decade of Human Rights Education, Trans-
national Radical Party, United Church Board for World Ministries, United Nations Asso-
ciation, Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, War & Peace Foundation, Washing-
ton Office on Latin America, World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy,
Womens Environment and Development Organization, World Federalist Association,
World Order Models Project, and World Organization of Building Officials.
1997
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creating opportunities for generating ideas, and for informal meetings
with delegates (such as that which produced the 'Siracusa drafts' and
the July 1996 meeting of delegates from the so-called "like-minded
States" which resulted in three major texts being presented at the
1996 PrepCom) through which experts can offer advice to the dele-
gates. Equally, the close attention which NGOs have paid to the pro-
ceedings of the PrepCom, the meetings which NGO Coalition have held
during the PrepCom with various States, groups of States, and other
influential elements inside the ICC process, and the lobbying which
has gone on at the UN, have all served to sustain and strengthen the
momentum of the process. At a broader level, outside of the PrepCom,
efforts to influence political leaders, to create worldwide awareness of
the Court issue, and hence support for the court has been crucial to
the level of development at which the court process finds itself today.
The influence which NGOs have had to date and will have until the
end of this process is crucial to its success, and should be acknowl-
edged as such.
42. The outcome of the 1997-98 PrepCom sessions will have a de-
termining impact on the convening and success of a diplomatic confer-
ence in 1998. However, if the 1997-98 PrepCom does not produce a
satisfactory Draft Statute, it will delay the convening of a diplomatic
conference, or else add so much work to that conference that it may
take several sessions extending beyond 1998 for its conclusion. To
avoid this potential situation the nine weeks of the 1997-98 PrepCom
must be used most effectively.
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